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Abstract 
Many socio-political sites have emerged where science and politics interact. In this article we explore 
how climate change science is connected to climate change governance. When formally 
institutionalised, as in IPCC or UNFCCC, these sites may be referred to as boundary organisations. 
These institutions engage in the quality assessment of scientific research, but also the design of 
innovative policy instruments, or evaluation of policy impacts – activities that we refer to as 
boundary work. Boundary work is inherently ‘tricky business’. Science and politics are normally 
demarcated spheres with different sacred stories. Scientists aspire to ‘speak truth to power’, while 
policymakers want ‘politics on top and science on tap’. Boundary work endeavours to coordinate 
these apparently incompatible aspirations. In this article we describe, analyse and assess whether, to 
what extent, and how the major international and some national boundary organisations in climate 
change governance have been able to avoid over-politicisation and over-scientization. We 
demonstrate that the nature and success of boundary organisations and the ways they work depend 
on: (1) the degree to which the climate change problem is defined as ‘wicked’ or unstructured, or as 
(relatively) ‘tame’ and structured; (2) the stage of the policy process; and (3) characteristics of the 
policy network and the socio-political context:  the degree to which relevant players insist on strict 
separation and a linear relation from science to politics, or, alternatively, are tolerant of  a blurring 
of the boundaries and hence a two-way, co-productive relation between science and politics.  
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Like many environmental problems, climate change became perceptible only through increasing 
scientific knowledge.  Scientific knowledge compiled by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) has been at the heart of attempts to build a global policy regime centred on the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and especially its Kyoto protocol.1 The IPCC is a 
prominent example of a boundary organisation. These are ‘institutions that straddle the shifting 
divide between politics and science’.2 Until recently, the IPCC commanded such respect that it was 
awarded the Nobel Peace prize in 2007. However, in 2009 this esteem was shaken as a result of the 
events that became known as ‘climategate’: the disclosure of a number of emails between climate 
prominent scientists that appeared to show scientists manipulating data about climate change and 
attempting to suppress dissenting scientific papers. Although no misconduct was eventually found, 
these events, along with the discovery  of some minor errors in the 4th IPCC assessment report,3,4 
tarnished the public trust in climate scientists and the IPCC, fuelled climate scepticism, and arguably 
contributed to deadlock in the negotiations of the 2009 Conference of Parties (COP15) in 
Copenhagen. A better understanding of the science-policy interface is crucial to understanding the 
history of the changing status of climate change science, and the current challenges facing climate 
change policy making. 
This review of what we know about the science-politics interface in climate change governance 
starts from the premise that productive interaction requires so-called boundary work5 to coordinate 
and at the same time separate the worlds of science and policy/politics. We describe how boundary 
work in international and national climate change governance is organised in boundary 
arrangements or organisations. These organisations are embedded in and shaped by contexts of 
policy issue politics and political-cultural spheres.6,7 We discuss how the characteristics of boundary 
work and boundary arrangements in the international climate policy regime and its interactions with 
national regimes help understand why UNFCCC implementation is stalling. We conclude with a 
cautious discussion of directions for improved boundary work. How this can be embedded in new or 
existing boundary arrangements is context-dependent, as both theory and our empirical material 
demonstrate.  
BOUNDARY WORK: A MULTILEVEL HEURISTIC FRAMEWORK 
The relationship between science and politics is often conceptualised as a linear process of 
knowledge transfer, research use or impact.8,9,10 Policymakers and politicians like to suggest that 
they are ‘on top’ and call on the services of scientists who are ‘on tap’. Scientists see their role as 
neutral, objective and independent experts, speaking ‘truth to power’. However, both these ‘sacred’ 
or front-office narratives of idealised worlds neglect the more ‘profane’ or back-office truth that the 
production of policy advice cannot realistically be described in terms of clear boundaries between 
science and politics;  the zones of engagement and transgression are inevitably fluid and vague. 
From a macro-perspective, science-policy interactions are on-going co-productions11 between the 
scientization of politics and the politicisation of science.12 At meso- and micro-level there is not a 
complete blurring of boundaries. Given the need for participation from different institutional 
spheres in the production of policy advice, a division of work is required.  
Boundary work can then be understood as the attempts to define practices in contrast to each other 
through demarcation, as well as attempts to find productive coordination through a division of 
labour.5,13 In the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), experts and policy makers literally 
work together: in such conditions boundary work always happens, whether intentionally or not. 
Concern for high-quality performance makes expert advisors and policymakers mutually dependent; 
yet, they have to guard their separate identities and formal independence.  Demarcation and 
coordination are two sides of the same coin. Boundary work is full of paradoxes and dilemmas: the 
relationship may look stable, but will always remain contested. Boundary work occurs in all science-
policy interactions at different levels (Figure 1)6,7 and to present a comprehensive picture therefore 
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means to understand multilevel science-policy interactions and the ways these levels interact. The 
multilevel heuristic framework presented below draws together insights from older work on science-
politics interactions and more recent research perspectives. 2,5,14,15,16 We will now describe each of 
these levels, including insights that will help understand boundary work in climate change 
governance at each  level.   
 
Figure 1.  Multi-level conceptual framework for understanding science-policy interactions 
 
Boundary work in projects 
At the micro-level, policy advice projects reveal practices where the boundary is at its most fuzzy and 
sometimes ‘up for grabs’, as it has to be negotiated and renegotiated in the smallest details; for 
example when the Statement for Policymakers and the Synthesis Reports are produced by the IPCC 
Working Groups. Important aspects of boundary work in projects are unwritten rules, habits and 
expectations for dealing with uncertainty, with conflicting knowledge, and with different knowledge 
types. New participants or a new context, for example the post-‘climategate’ scrutiny by the 
InterAcademy Council, mean that these rules have to be re-negotiated.  
The quality of boundary work projects for policymakers (indicated by the dotted upward feedback 
loops) can be evaluated by the degree to which criteria of credibility (technically adequate in 
handling of evidence), legitimacy (fair, unbiased, respectful of all stakeholders) and salience 
(relevant to the decision or policy) are simultaneously achieved for relevant stakeholders to the 
extent possible.17,18 Students of knowledge utilisation distinguish between three types of policy 
relevance: instrumental (science delivers data and establishes causalities), conceptual (science 
delivers new ideas), and symbolic (science legitimizes decisions already taken).10,19 For scientists, 
projects represent monetary and symbolic resources for specific research programmes or, more 
broadly, epistemic debates on promising new (inter)disciplines, paradigms, or long-term research 
lines (also indicated by upward feedback loops). 
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Boundary organisations 
Boundary organisations are the formalised manifestation of the more general phenomenon of 
boundary arrangements.2,20 Boundary arrangements include a wide variety of hybrid organisational 
forms that straddle and mediate the boundary between professional-academic networks and public 
sector or policy organisations, of which formal boundary organisations are one type.21 Boundary 
organisations typically display several features. Not all of these occur in each organisation, and each 
may be present in stronger or weaker form15,18: 
Double participation: people from both the policy/politics and the scientific world are represented 
and participate in the activities of the boundary organisation or arrangement, as well as 
professionals who serve a mediating role. For example, in the IPCC government-appointed scientists, 
diplomats representing national governments, NGOs and business representatives interact in varying 
configurations.22,23  
Dual accountability: the leadership or management is simultaneously accountable to representatives 
of both science and politics. For example, the European Environment Agency has a Management 
Board to deal with political issues like salience and legitimacy, and a Scientific Board to attend to 
issues of scientific credibility.24 Dual accountability leads to a split between sacred or front-office 
narratives of boundary work for official use in external accountability relations, e.g. to members of 
parliament and the press, and profane or back-office ‘insider’ narratives in internal accountability 
relations, e.g. between experts of different advisory bodies and departmental policy makers.25,26,27 
This ‘double-speak’ is reflected in the scientific accounts of the science-policy interface: linear 
transfer being the sacred story, and boundary work for productive co-production as the profane 
account. Paradoxically, in order to enable boundary work as productive interaction, it is in the 
institutional self-interest of both science and politics to co-produce the linear knowledge transfer 
story as official legitimation of their relationship.  
Use of boundary objects: boundary organisations provide the opportunity and sometimes the 
incentives for the creation and use of boundary objects and standardized packages that generate a 
‘symbolic world’ in which both scientists and policymakers may coordinate their activities.28,29 
Examples are indicator systems, econometric or climate models, report series, etc. In IPCC, key texts 
like the Statement for Policymakers and the Synthesis Reports, but also methods of calculating 
anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions are typical examples of boundary objects since they are the 
result of procedural and substantive intertwinement of scientific and political considerations.22,23 
 
Policy issue politics 
Boundary organisations are part of larger policy networks. Such networks have policy issue politics, 
i.e. the combination of cognitive processes (‘puzzling’) and competitive interaction (‘powering’) that 
is characteristic for policymaking in a particular domain.30 Policy issue politics usually follow the logic 
of the type of policy problem and the stage of the policymaking process.  
Problem types constrain which problem solving strategy and policymaking style is appropriate.30 In 
the case of structured problems (strong value consensus and knowledge certainty) a central-rational 
rule approach to governance permits ‘outsourcing’ problem solving to bureaucratic or 
scientific/professional, closed epistemic communities.31 In the case of unstructured or ‘wicked’ 
problems (high value dissent and lasting deep uncertainties) an agonistic and polarised governance 
style will come about, allowing numerous and different types of stakeholders to play a role, 
sometimes with flexible boundary arrangements as spaces for open deliberation and learning. 
Intermediate problem types of moderately structured problems (goals or means) give rise to 
pragmatic, overlapping professional and advocacy networks and arrangements.30  
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Figure 2.  Problem structure typology and types of policy issue politics  
 
Another influence depends on the stage of the policymaking process.32 During the early stages of 
issue definition and agenda-setting, scientists have considerable freedom to deviate from the sacred 
notions of science-politics interaction. This offers them leverage to influence problem definition in 
public debate by scientific narratives, not necessarily only scientific evidence.  In later stages of 
adoption/legislation and implementation, public scrutiny and formal role definitions of political 
actors (political parties, members of parliament, political executives) and administrative 
functionaries (government departments and officials) and media players (columnists, journalists, 
anchor(wo)men) force scientists to play by the strict rules of evidence-production and evidence-
based policy. This means that the more a policy matures over time, the more the public status and 
role of science in policymaking becomes vulnerable to criticism and erosion.  
The science-politics nexus is relatively easy to organise for (moderately) structured problems in the 
early phases of policymaking. In such cases, boundary organisations necessarily but willingly adapt to 
a politically dominant problem frame (hence the downward straight arrow from policy issue politics 
to boundary organisations in figure 1). In  cases of conceptual use of science, usually in the early, 
plastic stage of agenda-setting for new policy problems, scientists (and boundary organisations) may 
strongly influence the problem framing itself32 – hence the upward dotted arrow in Figure 1 from 
boundary organisations to policy issue politics. Importantly, political and cognitive tensions arise in 
the case of wrong-problem problems: when a policy problem is dealt with as if it is one type, while it 
should be dealt with as another. Most commonly, this occurs when policy problems once dealt with 
as structured, later in the policy process show re-emerging value dissent and lasting politically 
relevant uncertainties in the knowledge base.30      
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Political-cultural sphere 
Boundary work is culture-specific. There is overwhelming evidence that responses to (new) policy 
developments are influenced by political cultures and regulatory styles.33,34,35,36,37 The political-
cultural sphere describes a particular governance space which coordinates the production, 
dissemination and acceptability of knowledges for political decisions. Normally political decisions 
have to align different types of knowledge from different actors: citizens, professionals, bureaucrats, 
and experts. The political-cultural sphere acquires its special character precisely because it implicitly 
or explicitly manifests a particular public epistemology, i.e. taken-for-granted expectations about the 
legitimacy and validity of these intertwined knowledges.30,35,38 There is some evidence for the 
emergence of global or transnational cultures that influence national political cultures and policy 
styles.39,40,41 Understanding the disjoint between these emerging global or transnational cultures, 
and particular local political cultures or civic epistemologies is crucial to understanding climate 
politics and boundary work in different contexts.  As Hulme and Mahony42 put it: ‘Revealing the local 
and situated characteristics of climate change knowledge thus becomes central for understanding 
both the acceptance and resistance that is shown towards the knowledge claims of the IPCC’ 
(Reference 42, p.714). 
In the next sections this multi-level heuristic framework of boundary work, boundary organisations, 
policy issue politics and political-cultural spheres (Figure 1) will be used to discuss the most salient 
features of boundary organisations for climate change policy and politics in the international arena 
and in two selected industrialised Annex I political regimes (US and EU) and one industrialising or 
developing non-Annex I country (India). But first we discuss important empirical and conceptual 
limitations of this article. 
Best practices? 
When boundary work and boundary organisations are indispensible, the question about ‘best 
practice’ emerges.  It can be evaluated in terms of politicisation of science and scientization of 
politics.12 Both over-politicisation and over-scientization can be considered a failure of boundary 
work: they indicate that scientists and policymakers in their coordination efforts have ignored 
relevant demarcation issues. The evidence of dual participation, dual accountability and use of 
boundary objects can also be used to assess conditions under which creating credible, legitimate and 
salient knowledge for policymakers is likely to succeed. 
Unfortunately, the question of best practice is easier asked than answered. First, there are still many 
‘blind spots’, since the lens of boundary work has not been applied sufficiently often and in depth, 
certainly not in the study of (global or national) climate change science-policy interactions. In our 
review we found that existing literature focuses on a few Western countries and on the IPCC; and 
even there detailed descriptions of the inner workings of boundary arrangements are rare (see 
below).  This means that the discovery of necessary and sufficient conditions in which criteria for 
‘quality boundary work’ are met is near impossible since the detailed data needed do not (yet) exist. 
Second, even if data limitations were less serious, any criteria and conditions for ‘good’ boundary 
work can only be very broadly specified because successful boundary organisations have adjusted to 
their context of policy issue politics and political-cultural spheres. Moreover, boundary organisations 
not only work on the production of knowledge (‘problem solving’) within given problem framings 
that are separately settled at the policy politics level. Sometimes boundary work’s impact on 
governance is greater when they advance and frame policy problems at this level, as will be 
illustrated by our analysis of IPCC.  Whether or not such greater impact should be considered 
‘success’ or a ‘wrong-problem problem’ is debatable, however.  
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MAKING CLIMATE CHANGE INTERNATIONALLY GOVERNABLE  
International boundary organisations: a global climate change regime complex  
Global climate change governance has entered the stage of a ‘regime complex’ due to its growing 
differentiation and apparent fragmentation43 as a maturing policy domain in many subnational, 
national and transnational settings. This means that by now numerous institutions exist that mix 
scientific and political elements in remarkably different ways.16 Key among the international 
boundary organisations are the rather well-researched Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) which claims to coordinate the production of ‘policy-relevant and yet policy-neutral’ scientific 
work42 and the far less researched Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) of 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).15 SBSTA has been referred 
to as a ‘gatekeeper’ linking the predominantly scientific information provided by the IPCC to the 
policy-oriented needs of the Conference of the Parties (COP).15,44 Related boundary organisations are 
the Climate Bureau, the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) and the Intergovernmental 
Negotiation Committee (INC, 1990-1995), the temporary body tasked by developing countries with 
steering the complicated international negotiations leading to the UNFCCC.45 The latter three have 
hardly been researched at all.46  
Collectively these international boundary organisations are embedded in and help constitute an 
emerging transnational multilevel governance culture7 or a new global public epistemology.36,38,47 
Different from the relatively stable national public epistemologies, a fragile international knowledge 
order has to span a much wider diversity of scientific and political institutions from a huge number 
of countries and policy issue areas. This leads to confrontations between national epistemologies 
and boundary work arrangements. 
The history of the foundation and early years of IPCC is such a clash between public epistemologies 
and policy styles; in this case between US climate scientists, the US federal government, and the UN. 
In the 1980s US climate scientists pressed for political and policy action from the US government 
based on their growing body of scientific knowledge and its dominant narrative of possibly risky 
global warming. US politicians reduced the domestic agenda setting power of US climate scientists to 
merely influence US climate research policy.32 But the scientists kept advocating climate change 
policy action through bodies like the UN World Meteorological Organisation and UN Environment 
Programme. By allowing and encouraging the setting up a UN expert body, the IPCC, US politicians 
channelled climate change science activism in international policymaking channels. Although the US 
government embraced the same linear model of knowledge production and application as the 
climate scientists, it strategically used elements of the UN expert-bureaucratic culture that stresses 
representation over expertise and includes direct but fuzzy boundaries between scientific 
assessments and negotiation forums.48 The intergovernmental character of the IPCC, including 
articulate arrangements for dual participation and accountability, meant that the US government 
could keep some political grip on the international activities of US scientists and influence the 
boundary work practices in the IPCC.  
Even though IPCC was in practice a profane and back-office compromise between science and 
politics45, it held on to a sacred and front-office narrative of a hegemonic US epistemic culture, that 
stresses strict rules and a sharp, but transparent science-policy boundary.34 The furtive de facto co-
production of a publicly espoused linear relation between climate change science and politics 
created an image of the IPCC as predominantly scientific. This image-building was more successful 
for Working group I (doing the climate assessments) than Working groups II and III (dealing with 
more mixed scientific and policy-analytic issues of mitigation and adaptation, respectively).  
The flexibility of the division of labour between science and politics is especially clear in the 
boundary work performed in the SBSTA on the creation and maintenance of appropriate boundaries 
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and jurisdictions between interacting organisations.15 The SBSTA delimited discussions between the 
IPCC and the COP based on whether particular issues were considered political or value-based 
decisions (best dealt with by the COP) and scientific issues (best dealt with by the IPCC).  Such inter-
organisational orchestration is not limited to the SBSTA however23,22,45; for example Fogel49 illustrates 
the complex mix of ‘puzzling and powering’ that occurs in both the SBSTA and the IPCC around 
issues such as defining the terms of reference of an IPCC special report (which occurred at the 
SBSTA), to struggles around the precise distinction between policy relevance and policy 
prescriptiveness (which occurred in the IPCC), to debates and struggles about the presentation and 
management of uncertainty (which occurred in the IPCC). 
Framing the climate change problem as global warming  
In the 1980s until the 1992 adoption of the UNFCCC, international boundary work has had a major 
impact on how climate change was structured and framed as a global, world-wide issue. Framing 
climate change as a global policy issue settled the boundary arrangements for the co-production of 
climate change science and climate change politics until the 2009 events of ‘climategate’. In addition 
to the politics of issue recognition and mobilizing political support, crucial cognitive steps were taken 
to structure and frame the three elements that shape any public policy problem: problem 
ownership, causality, and accountability.50,51  
An all-important element of framing a policy problem is to fix its causality. In line with scientific 
consensus on the narrative of a global climate crisis scenario as global warming, and scientific 
practices of using Global Circulation Model simulations, climate change was politically defined as a 
global issue.52,5354  This ‘globalisation of the atmosphere’52 came to side-line previously dominant 
discourses that had framed increasing atmospheric carbon dioxide in terms of specific risks to local 
places. It also settled the ownership of the problem: As Miller puts it: ‘[o]nly when the Earth’s 
climate was re-imagined as a global system, bringing views of the atmosphere into line with 
assumptions about the jurisdiction of international institutions, did claims about climate change 
begin to engage with debates about international politics’(Reference 52, p. 51). Formally, problem 
ownership was settled with the adoption of UNFCCC in 1992. This meant that the issue was to be 
tackled through the institutional architecture and features typical for international multilateral 
agreements. UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol were constructed by analogies from past treaties.45,55 
The designers thought the global warming problem ought to be tackled through global emission 
controls, ‘treating tonnes of carbon dioxide like stockpiles of nuclear weapons to be reduced by 
mutually agreed and verifiable targets and timetables’.56 Once problem ownership was politically 
settled, accountability disputes immediately sprang up. The global scale of the climate change 
problem results in a notable asymmetry experienced by local populations who are asked to meet 
locally concentrated short-term costs (around which there is little uncertainty), in order to reap 
globally dispersed future gains (around which there is considerable uncertainty).   
This unresolved issue of scale and time asymmetry inevitably involves both intellectual and political 
struggles on how to draw boundaries around problems.7 From a political ‘powering’ angle, policy 
framings that locally concentrate certain costs to achieve globally dispersed long-term and uncertain 
benefits require an actively persuasive style of politics and policy implementation.57 This framing 
impacted in two ways on national decision making climates. One is the political polarization between 
activists and ‘wait-and-see’ defenders, as in the US pluralist system, exemplified by both fierce 
protagonists like Al Gore, and committed antagonists like the ‘braking coalition’.45 The other impact 
is dramaturgical or symbolic politics58 manifest in EU and European countries’ politics. It means 
grand-standing during COPs on (supra)national carbon dioxide stabilization or reduction targets, in 
full knowledge that these public promises are unachievable in the normal channels of  slow and 
step-by-step policymaking back home.  
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These different styles of policy issue politics lead to remarkable differences in boundary work. Both 
activists and symbolic incrementalists will be inclined to invite and believe science to reduce 
knowledge uncertainty. Antagonists or ‘deniers’, in turn, will scrutinize the science for errors and 
uncertainties, thereby creating boundary organisations as ‘merchants of doubt’.59 But even for the 
cognitive ‘puzzling’ by incorruptible scientists issues of scale and time asymmetry lead to serious 
disputes over uncertainty management. On the one hand, conscientious scientists dutifully 
communicate uncertainty in their findings. On the other hand, they are aware of the possible 
strategic uses of scientific uncertainty in politics.45 Thus, scientists convinced about the truthfulness 
of their own research and of the need for politicians to take action, will be tempted to deliver the 
certainty politicians desire. This may lead to boundary work as ‘stealth advocacy’.55 Looking at the 
stepwise increased certainty of IPCC statements about the probability of the anthropogenic part of 
global warming, and the way the EU and EU countries have used the IPCC as an ‘uncertainty 
reduction machine’ to close down national climate change policy debate and uphold the Kyoto 
negotiation process, it is only understandable that both political actors and scientists have question 
marks about the role of IPCC and European boundary organisations. It demonstrates the tendency of 
boundary organisations to become vulnerable to losses of credibility and trust as ‘their’ policy issue 
matures, but with less than promised tangible results.  
In addition, and perhaps even more important, accountability struggles around the global framing of 
the climate problem drive a wedge between rich and poor countries. Thus many developing 
countries resisted the global, technical framing of the climate issue, based on climate modelling in 
North America, Europe and Japan, arguing that issues of development, equity and poverty 
alleviation were fundamental, and should not be brushed aside in the new climate regime.60  For 
example Biermann61  focuses on the IPCC’s decision to divide emissions into just two categories 
(natural and anthropogenic) in its first report in 1995, rather than making a distinction between 
subsistence emissions (such as those resulting from rice farming and livestock) and more luxury 
emissions (such as those resulting from car transport).  He suggests this correlated with the 
overwhelming participation of northern scientists. 
In light of the widespread awareness of the regional bias in participation at the IPCC, several 
mechanisms have been suggested to increase participation by developing country experts in 
international boundary work, notably by funding travel costs to meetings, and calls for increased 
funding for the development of climate models in southern institutions. However, none of these 
suggestions would alleviate the deeper discursive dominance of particular issue framings 
policy.62,63,64 As Friman and Linnér60 put it: ‘[s]chooling people in the workings of a closed discourse – 
that is a predefined way of framing an issue – is not the same as promoting an inclusive process’ 
(Reference 60, p. 347).  
They argue that regional biases in the framing of climate change result from dominant disciplinary 
framings of the climate issue, particularly a ‘non-inclusive biophysical discourse traditionally 
preferred by Northern policy makers’ (Reference 60, p. 339; see also65,66,67,68)  There is growing 
recognition of an ‘epistemological hierarchy’67 in the regime of climate governance, whereby certain 
types of knowledge, most notably the geophysical sciences, and economics, are promoted while 
others are marginalised.69 O’Neill et al argue that this bias matters because ‘[b]y marginalizing 
certain framings of climate change — framings which may help to address the “wickedness” of 
climate change — fruitful political and social responses may be excluded’ (Reference 67, p. 998).  
In the section on non-Annex I countries like India we return to these issues. All in all, when the 
scientific causal narrative of atmospheric warming inspired a political problem definition as global 
warming70, political questions of problem ownership and accountability or responsibility were 
practically immediately given. The scientific-cum-political consensus of the early days of global 
climate change policy ‘froze’ into an international policy infrastructure which included boundary 
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organisations like IPCC, SBSTA and the UNFCCC as major players. Since climate change was 
considered a (moderately) structured policy problem with considerable goal consensus, western 
politicians and climate scientists alike found it easy to set up and legitimise boundary organisations 
and boundary work as one-way communication and cooperation: climate science informs climate 
change policy which will solve climate change problems. Publicly espousing this sacred narrative 
obliged players from both institutional spheres to downplay the every-day realties of their 
collaboration. Thus, the day-to-day management of boundary organisations as hybrids between 
politics and climate science was forced to keep the official and public right hand from knowing what 
the informal and off-the-record left hand was simultaneously doing. This formally upheld image of 
international climate change boundary organisations was to legitimise climate change discourse and 
especially the UNFCCC approach the climate change policy for decades to come.   
NATIONAL AND REGIONAL RESPONSES 
This global problem framing and the global governance regime did not transfer unchanged or 
unchallenged to national levels. Rather, boundary work and boundary organisations at national level 
display strong instrumental roles in support of their national governments.  We illustrate this 
through a brief sketch of boundary work and boundary organisations in the US, the EU and India. We 
selected these examples as demonstration of the range of international responses: the US as 
industrialised country resisting the UNFCCC’s Kyoto regime; the EU as strong supporter; and India as 
a leading developing country in opposition.  Another reason for selecting the US and the EU is that 
boundary organisations and their contexts have been studied to some extent. We opted for India as 
one of the largest two of the emerging economies with most political influence, China being the 
other one, who also have the largest future carbon dioxide emission potential. Here we had to rely 
on literature that describes climate change governance in general, since boundary work concepts 
have not been used to analyze the arrangements in India.  
Boundary work in the US and the EU: politics on top, science on tap 
While the contents and conduct of policy debates in climate change are different in the US and the 
EU, they share two important similarities: the global and biophysical character of the climate change 
problem, and the strong focus on mitigation as a solution. This premature closure of the policy issue 
framing called into being very different but instrumental roles for science, and limited opportunities 
for re-framing. The different manners of this instrumentalisation of science, especially regarding the 
function of boundary organisations, is largely determined by the different public epistemologies.  
Boundary work in the United States: the US as ‘laggard’? 
The United States has resisted binding international emissions targets or federal-level emissions 
controls; preferring instead to focus on voluntary programs.71 Ironically, given their image as a 
‘laggard’ in global climate policy, federal funding for climate science is the largest in the world.24  Key 
among climate-relevant boundary organisations is the US Global Change Research Program 
(USGCRP) which coordinates and integrates approximately 2.6 billion dollars of research, and is 
responsible for coordinating US participation in the assessments of the IPCC.  US scientists thus keep 
playing an important role in the IPCC, but they do less so in national US climate change politics and 
policy because their domestic influence is de facto limited to climate change research policy only.32,72  
Boundary work for climate policy itself takes place in the very visible shadow of political power. The 
body whose task it is to integrate, evaluate, and interpret the findings of the USGCRP for policy 
makers, and develop an assessment of global change impacts and adaptation and mitigation 
strategies for the US, is the program of National Climate Assessments (NCA).35 On a day-to-day basis, 
the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) plays an important role at the 
boundary between science and national policy-making.  In line with general policy on issues of 
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science, technology and innovation, laid down in the Federal Act on Advisory Committees (FACA), all 
federal advisory committees (including NCA and PCAST) are (largely) held in public and reports from 
the meetings are made public. This builds on an important aspect of the public epistemology of the 
US where conducting deliberations under the public gaze is considered ‘the best way to wash out 
personal bias and subjectivity’ (Reference 35, p. 269). However, this increases credibility problems 
for boundary workers when even small parts of  back-office coordination aimed at reconciling 
political and scientific criteria for good policy become publicly accessible, for example through media 
research and commentaries.  
Another reason for the lower likelihood of a national consensus on policy problem framing is the 
pluralist nature of the US federal political system, which is characterised by public dispute and 
controversy. A striking feature of the climate change debate is its politicization (largely along 
Republican/Democrat lines). There exists a powerful, vocal (and largely Republican) climate sceptic 
lobby, whose views can be summed up in the words of senator Jim Inhofe (R), who stated that ‘man-
made global warming’ was the ‘greatest hoax ever perpetrated on the American people’.17 The US 
climate science system, like the political system, is pluralistic, consisting of competing research 
institutions funded by different federal agencies and non-governmental interest groups, each with 
its own approach to climate science.73 This largely accords with Jasanoff’s description of the 
pluralistic nature of knowledge making practices in the US public epistemology where each party, 
provided it has money to pay for it, commissions its own research-as-argument, resulting in an 
apparent lack of research impact on the overall policy outcome.35  
While some observers argue that the prevalence of industry-sponsored climate scepticism in the US 
is responsible for its lack of support for global climate governance, or for the lack of federal level 
climate policy59, others argue that the presence of climate sceptics in the US is not the cause of the 
problem but a symptom of the way in which climate science has become inter-twined with a single, 
top-down international policy framework.74 Such a governance regime generally does not sit well 
with the institutionally reinforced US preference for more disjointed and fragmented policymaking 
that incrementally learns about best practice. This is one important reason why the US has initiated 
and supported ‘mini-lateral’ climate policy initiatives outside the remit of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol. In terms of boundary work, this implies a preference for temporary, ad-hoc and tailor-
made boundary arrangements over well-established and funded boundary organisations at national 
scale. Here is a major difference with boundary work in the EU. 
Boundary work in the European Union:  ‘leader’ in international climate politics? 
The EU has always cast itself as a supporter and diplomatic leader of an international climate policy 
regime. However, the EU role was not devoid of self-interest.39 Internally, the EU was looking to 
environmental issues as a new legitimation of its very existence; externally, climate change being 
perceived as the world’s greatest sustainability challenge, claiming a leadership role provided the EU 
with an opportunity to showcase its political identity to its own member states and their citizens (UK 
secretary of state Miliband in 2006, quoted in Reference 55, p. 106). Setting up itself as ‘leader’ over 
and against the US as ‘laggard’ helped boost the EU’s weight in the global political arena.75  
In contrast to the highly politicized US political system, the EU is a governance system specializing in 
de-politicized regulatory policy, whose primary need is scientific advice.76 EU climate change policy is 
largely made by the European Commission’s bureaucracy in Brussels, especially the Directorates-
General for Environment and Research, even though its major boundary organisation, the European 
Environmental Agency (EEA) is located in Copenhagen. Originally cast in the narrow role of 
independent information provider for policymakers and the general public, the EEA contributed to 
the early formulation of EU GHG stabilization targets and timetables. EEA is also credited by some 
authors for some less instrumental and more conceptual contributions to climate change policy 
through the design of market-driven policy instruments, the precautionary principle (its study Late 
12 
 
Lessons from Early Warnings, 2001) and methods and procedures for iterative risk assessment.77 The 
advocacy by EEA experts for market-based policy instruments was at first resisted by DG 
Environment because EEA’s mandate did not include policy design and evaluation.78 Since these 
functions were added in 1999, EEA developed into a full-fledged boundary organisation.24  As well as 
the EEA, several units of the Joint Research Centre perform boundary work functions for the 
Commission de facto as quasi-independent extensions of the EU bureaucracy. 
The European Commission cherishes its boundary arrangements not only as resources for advice, 
but also as vehicles for political articulation of research questions and steering of knowledge 
production. Its European Research Area (ERA) initiative and the Framework multi-year research 
programmes are all strongly geared to the EU’s knowledge demand. Using these instruments, the EU 
effectively creates boundary projects and ad-hoc arrangements that unite and coordinate research 
activities of major European knowledge institutes and universities. Swart et al.79 report on the 
myriad boundary projects in European countries working on issues of climate adaptation. This ties 
the scientists involved to instrumental contributions to existing EU-level policy lines; where they try 
to go for more conceptual and critical contributions, these are frequently nipped in the bud.78,80  
Jordan et al. 81clearly show how policy instrument design (for environmental policies) is strongly 
influenced by national policy styles and cultures, and is not the technical, apolitical process that the 
label ‘policy instrument’ suggests. For example, EEA experts’ choice for market-driven, as opposed to 
tax-based, climate change policy instruments was as much a political choice to respect taxation as 
the hallmark of member states’ sovereignty as it was a technical-instrumental contribution to 
climate change policy.    In a prophetic article, Wynne82 described the EU’s emerging climate change 
policy as ‘early warning’ for the importance of political culture in policy design and implementation. 
He predicted for example how differences between economic sectors and countries, especially 
between the North (Denmark, The Netherlands, Germany) and the South of Europe (Italy, Spain, 
Greece), would cause deep and lasting disagreements on binding carbon reduction targets due to 
different carbon intensities. For scientific expertise this has meant that EU expert bodies like the EEA 
and especially national environmental expert bodies have been exposed to, on the one hand, trends 
of harmonization and expert consensus for the sake of creating a single European market, and, on 
the other hand, expert pluralisation for the sake of decision support to regional and national climate 
policy initiatives.83  
Boundary work in India: domesticating climate change as foreign policy  
The overall response to international climate change science-policy developments in prominent non-
Annex I countries such as India and China is a rejection of the dominant problem frame and solution 
strategy. With their increasing economic and political power, this negative response to and 
interaction with the global climate regime is increasingly important. However, little is known about 
the boundary work that occurs in these countries. Climate change was initially only on the agenda in 
these countries because of UNFCCC negotiations and was therefore, and still remains, mainly a 
foreign affairs issue. The perceived need to respond to such external policy initiatives has often 
driven analysts’ efforts to develop a national perspective and to build linkages with domestic policy-
makers.84,85 So far, international policy such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is mainly 
used to help solve domestic problems.86 
In India, energy is seen as the key to economic development and this is a main cause for 
unwillingness to take on emission reduction commitments. Hence, the international framing of 
climate change policy as mitigation hindered explicit national climate change policy-making, even 
though policies were developed that contributed to the same goal. Some initiatives were taken in 
relation to the energy and forestry sector which are to a large extent compatible with the 
requirements of international climate change policy but are not framed as such.87 Vulnerability to 
climate change is an emerging issue and this could contribute to elevating the climate change issue 
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on domestic agendas in the future. However, recently the Indian government has tried to reframe 
prevailing political discourses on climate change by introducing new frames and storylines that 
emphasize climate change as a national concern rather than as an international matter.88  
India (like other non-Annex 1 countries) has long argued that responsibility for climate change 
historically resides with the developed world. International emissions caps are viewed as ‘deepening 
the north–south divide’ by capping emissions just as its development is taking off.89 In India there is 
a strong perception that the international negotiation processes are a disguise for continued 
economic and political domination of developing countries by the industrialized North90; getting into 
substantive discussions may only weaken the position of the country.87 Finally, foreign funding for 
climate change policy analyses is dominant. Multilateral and bilateral agencies attempt to impose 
their own (dominant) views of these countries’ role in ‘global’ policy for climate change, so policy 
analysis is biased towards mitigation rather than the more relevant assessment of vulnerability and 
adaptation strategies.84  
India has a relatively stable democratic political system, a relatively well informed governing class, a 
free press, a well-established scientific community and active nongovernmental organisations that 
should be, in theory, well-placed to support, promote and demand quality climate change-related 
policies. However, freedom of information has been an issue. Until 2005 access to governmental 
documents and technical reports were available, if at all, only through leaks or other informal 
channels91. In 2005, the Right to Information Act was introduced and climate activists and 
researchers have used it to get access to government documents.92 Mistrust in scientific institutions 
and a lack of regional knowledge may adversely affect both mitigation and adaptation efforts.88 
Foreign funding helps keep issues on the donor agencies’ agenda alive in Indian science and policy 
circles.93  
Modelled on the British system, links between scientists and policy makers often operate in an 
informal manner. Generally, India’s ‘policy for science’ has been dictated by close alliances between 
powerful leaders and their scientific advisors. Prior to IPCC or UNFCCC meetings these experts might 
be called upon to provide rapid advice on a particular issue, as and when needed, produce position 
papers upon request, and to participate in more structured activities to inform and guide policy-
makers prior to UNFCCC or IPCC meetings. Many of these advisors are over-subscribed and play 
multiple roles: as scientists and analysts, as advisors to the Indian government, and as members of 
the IPCC or other international bodies. Although this places limits on the time that the top cadre of 
experts can devote to active research, it also allows them to gain a comprehensive view of issues 
surrounding climate change, and to develop a well-informed stance. As far as national policymaking 
is concerned, there is substantial turnover in the personnel handling any particular issue in the 
government. Consequently, the Ministry of Environment and Forests lacks a systematic approach for 
dealing with climate change, and there are almost no mechanisms for building in ‘institutional 
memory’ on the issue. This has led to frustration among many in the research community about the 
lack of interest in climate change issues at the national policy level.84  Kandlikar &  Sagar’s 1999 
assessment84 was confirmed by the 2010 Climate Revolution Initiative report.92  
Policy analyses of the social, economic, and technological aspects of climate change are primarily 
conducted at a few large NGOs, research institutes, and some academic institutions. The Tata Energy 
Research Institute (TERI), a think tank in Delhi, and the Center for Science and Environment (CSE), a 
Delhi-based NGO, are the two most prominent players. They have been involved since the inception 
of climate policy and offer a traditional understanding of policy engagement through proximity to 
government actors and involvement in policy networks.94 The timing and targets of their efforts are 
often chosen strategically to make an impact upon the Indian policy stance. TERI is a mainstream 
organisation whose advice is important to the government. CSE emerged as one of the most 
articulate and influential environmental voices in India and appears to enjoy almost a symbiotic 
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relationship with the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF). It was CSE  who in their ‘citizens’ 
report’95  challenged the assumptions behind the calculations in a 1990 report of the World 
Resources Institute (WRI) which stated that developing countries ranked high among greenhouse 
gas emitters because of deforestation and other human activities resulting in carbon releases, thus 
showing the importance of scrutinising ‘Western’ science. To aid information flows and enhance the 
credibility of national climate policies the Indian government has recently instituted the Indian 
Network on Climate Change with involvement of various scientific bodies around the country, the 
Mission for Strategic Knowledge as part of the NAPCC, and the Low Carbon Expert Group comprised 
of representatives from government, industry and civil society.88  It is too early to assess what 
impact these organisations have. 
The overall picture of science-policy interaction in India is (a) general lack of scientific capacity to 
provide knowledge needed for policy-making, and (b) bias towards producing science for 
international negotiations. Globally, the majority of the climate analysts are from industrialized 
countries and their work has generally focused on issues directly relevant to these countries. 
Members of the Indian research community are acutely aware of this ideological divide, and more 
specifically, of the political nature of the international assessment process. They recognize not just 
the South-North divide on climate change emissions and responsibility, but also in the inequities in 
the assessment capability, as well as the broader international context (such as economic 
globalization) in which the climate change issue sits. Their concerns vis-a-vis climate research and 
assessment include inequities in participation and decision-making about agendas, in funding, in 
research infrastructure, and in the representation of, and barriers to the acceptance of, ideas.88  
 
CONCLUSION: LOST IN THE PROBLEM 
Global boundary work: clinging to climate change as (moderately) structured problem 
Summarising global climate change governance from a boundary work perspective we conclude the 
following. First, at the level of global policy issue politics, the IPCC was set up in the early stage of 
issue definition and agenda-setting as a boundary organisation that assumed climate change was a 
technical issue, downplaying fundamental disagreements on goals and deep uncertainty on facts and 
means, and choosing the corresponding linear approach to science-policy interaction.55,96 In other 
words, in the implicit policy issue framing used by UNFCCC global climate change was a structured 
problem, when in fact, certainly in the international policy arena with many non-Western countries 
involved, climate change was and still is a  paradigmatically ‘wicked’ or unstructured problem where 
knowledge is uncertain and societies disagree on norms, values and goals.53 In such circumstances 
boundary work ought to have been more about opening up than closing down policy debates.64 By 
focusing on a single policy framework inspired by previous structured problems like nuclear arms 
reduction and ozone depletion, the UNFCCC-Kyoto protocol, the political space for debate was 
effectively closed down. Hence, Sarewitz74 plausibly argues that support for global climate policy has 
become indistinguishable from support for climate science, and political opposition to the UNFCCC is 
expressed as distrust of the science. In ‘climategate’ and the events in its wake this science-oriented 
boundary management of science-policy interaction exposed itself to serious allegations of inept 
management-by-hypocrisy.97  
Consistent with their assumption of a structured policy issue, the IPCC aimed for technical-specialist 
advice that would be instrumental, serviceable and solution-oriented for regulating ‘one’ global 
warming problem, to be tackled in a ‘sound science’ informed, harmonized, and standardized way 
for, in the end, all countries of the UN. Since its early beginnings in the 1980s, the UNFCCC policy 
community has doggedly clung to this approach. Ambivalent about its character as a true boundary 
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organisation, IPCC never developed its potential for co-production between science and politics to 
the full.23 As observed by Siebenhüner44, the IPCC missed opportunities for learning.  He noticed only 
first-order, instrumental learning in the IPCC and UNFCCC. No second-order reflexive learning took 
place, i.e. consideration of changes in the prevalent knowledge system, reinterpretation of purposes, 
choice of policy instruments or governance strategies.  Haas31 similarly judges that, although the 
early IPCC may have been successful in international agenda setting and in upholding credibility in 
climate knowledge, its legitimacy (for the US and developing countries) and salience (for all 
countries) were actually rather low: ‘the IPCC is designed to keep science on a tight leash by 
controlling the selection and autonomy of individual scientists engaged in the assessment process. 
Consequently, the degree of usable knowledge generated by the IPCC has been limited.44 In the 
debate on the role of the IPCC following 'climategate', the InterAcademy Council was charged with 
reviewing the IPCC’s procedures. In this review the boundary organisation character of the IPCC was 
not given due attention. Instead, the InterAcademy Council concentrated on scientific credibility 
issues by sharpening up the review procedure; less attention was given to legitimacy and salience 
issues, or more generally to the role assigned to the IPCC in the international and national climate 
policy regimes, although these issues are at least as significant for the status of the IPCC and the 
knowledge it produces.   
From such perspectives, ‘climategate’ was waiting to happen, as anticipated by Demeritt in 2001.54   
Instead of being designed as ‘certification machine’ and ‘scientific trigger’ to depoliticize a 
multilateral international agreement and further ‘smooth’ implementation, the IPCC should have 
been designed as a conceptual, critical and problem-oriented scientific and stakeholder forum for 
discussing and preparing strategic advice through opening up political debates and demonstrating 
the ‘serviceability’ of more than one type of policy discourse. The few studies of SBSTA show that it 
was more successful at this at the time than the IPCC, albeit much slower to produce agreement.15 
Second, at the level of political-cultural spheres, climate change was from the start framed as a 
global issue for which global solutions had to be found.52 However, although the IPCC claims to 
present universal, ‘policy relevant but policy neutral’ science, this science is not universally accepted 
as valid and authoritative or neutral. Jasanoff36,98  explains this as a problem of ‘global public 
epistemology’: ‘Though ‘intergovernmental’ in name, the IPCC is not answerable to particular 
national traditions of policy legitimation… Claims about the environment and its sustainability 
produced by such novel bodies inevitably function as sites of contestation among competing models 
of knowledge-making and governance’ (Reference 98, p.240). As global climate policy-making 
matured, national boundary arrangements, issue politics and political-cultural spheres responded 
differentially to the ‘universal’ climate change science. The geographic bias towards participation by 
experts from developed countries in IPCC assessments only meant that the issues raised by the 
global South were marginalised or ignored.87,99 Indeed, ‘global environmental policy making [..] 
needs to take serious account of deep-seated national ways of knowing  and acting, in short of civic 
epistemologies’ (Reference 36, p.140).  
Third, global boundary work failed through both over-politicization and over-scientization. Both 
Demeritt54 and Sarewitz74 argue that politics seeped into climate science at the international level 
because of the global framing and the association of climate science with just one policy option, i.e. 
the Kyoto Protocol. The other problem, the scientization of politics or the ‘rendering technical’100 of 
climate change also appears to be widespread. For example Friman and Linnér60 show how equity 
issues were transformed and obscured by technological debates and discussion at the IPCC, when 
‘the historical responsibility issue became stranded on problems of how to correctly represent 
physical nature in climate models’ (Reference 60, p. 339). Quality boundary work would draw more 
on politics to deal with value issues and more on science to deal with knowledge issues, while 
organising and managing the interweaving of both.   
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In the long run this situation in no small measure contributed to the challenges IPCC faced in the 
events of ‘climategate’ and subsequent exposure of mistakes in the Fourth Assessment Report. In 
the snake pit of global warming politics, global boundary work required careful oscillation between 
sacred/profane and front/back-office accounts of the IPCC’s international activities. The IPCC was 
under ever more scientific and political scrutiny due to its ever stronger statements on the certainty 
of the anthropogenic part of climate change in its successive assessment reports. Yet it was unable 
to be transparent to politics and science at the same time because the taboos in their sacred 
narratives. Hence, the IPCC’s boundary work became gradually more and more entangled in what 
Brunsson97 aptly called ‘management by hypocrisy’. When the deliberate or inadvertent leaking of 
email exchanges between leading climate scientists suggested manipulation of the peer review 
process55, the IPCC’s reputation for credibility went into a downward spiral in western countries, 
while its legitimacy problems within developing countries were only confirmed.  Direct repair work 
on credibility by the IAC leading to minor adjustments in IPCC protocols proved to be ‘too little, too 
late’.  In COP15 at Copenhagen the entire UNFCCC/Kyoto process came to a standstill; in later COPs 
the aspirations of the failed Kyoto process are toned down considerably.101 
Learning from national boundary arrangements? 
In all country studies the instrumental nature of boundary arrangements, organisations and projects 
stands out, serving the political interests of states (in the EU and in India ) or the political deadlock 
within a country (in the US). This affirms that having ‘our experts’ is crucial in national and 
international boundary work. Boundary work theory implies that expertise is a social relationship 
between a provider and user of expertise. Therefore, ‘nationalized’ expertise provides higher trust 
(closer sources are more credible) and political control (closer link between science and national 
politics).80 The US efforts to ‘inter-governmentalize’ the IPCC were inspired by the same logic.  
In developing countries like India boundary work is less structured than in the developed world. 
Boundary work for climate issues occurs mainly in informal, personal contacts between politicians, 
policymakers and scientists, sometimes working in state-supported think tanks, although boundary 
arrangements have recently been set up. However, after initial resistance to the climate change 
issue as another vehicle for continuing western dominance in a globalizing economic world order, 
the issue is somewhat gaining in legitimacy and salience mainly through embedding in other related 
national policy issues such as energy.  
In the EU we observed centrally harmonized and coordinated, instrumentalized boundary work 
arrangements and projects. Very different from the US, the EU uses its quasi-independent and 
decentrally located boundary organisations as vehicles for demand articulation and steering of 
climate change knowledge. In addition to the institutional self-interest in supporting a unitary and 
top-down international climate regime, this makes for very instrumental boundary work that would 
not seriously challenge problem definitions and belief systems at global or national levels. 
In the US, a pluralist political structure and adversarial culture leads to a polarized and politicized set 
of boundary arrangements, external to government, and with a sharp boundary between science 
and politics (at least in front office discourse), although most climate science is government-
sponsored. Fragmented, disjointed and experimental policymaking processes have created a 
contradiction between federal government as sceptical, and many state and regional and municipal 
governments as supportive of climate change policy. Local extreme weather conditions like 
hurricanes Katrina and Sandy may have contributed to (sub-)state level willingness to initiate and 
implement adaptation projects. Therefore, interestingly, the situation in the US has created 
contradictory tendencies in climate change politics that have frequently led to a ‘dialogue of the 
deaf’, but have at least the potential of opening up public and policy debate.  
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While some authors have focused on examining potential ways in which key boundary organisations 
such as the IPCC could improve their effectiveness, like the ‘earth system governance’ project102, 
others see increasing fragmentation of the climate regime, the uncertain and variable policy status 
of climate change knowledge, and the apparent failure of policy to achieve meaningful emissions 
reductions, as evidence of a fundamental flaw in current global framings of the climate change 
issue.103,104 They suggest that the inability of COPs since 2009 to reach any meaningful agreement on 
emissions reductions, signals the end of the era of global top-down policy instruments such as Kyoto, 
and perhaps the start of a new approach to the global issue of climate change including more 
diverse measures56 or a return to ‘mini-lateralism’.93 In a related vein, others draw hopeful attention 
to the growing divide between what is actually happening in the world in terms of  diverse policy-
making initiatives, and the global climate policy talks.105 Whatever the case, it should be clear that 
successful boundary arrangements are those that have adjusted to their diverse national contexts of 
policy issue politics and political-cultural spheres. Endeavours to identify imitable ‘best practice 
models’ for boundary arrangements in some detail soon run into these limitations.  
Ways forward: opening up debate 
What, then, can be done at this point? Acknowledging the climate change issue as unstructured 
policy problem, boundary work should aim to provide pluralized strategic advice, conceptual 
clarification, and critical deconstruction of issues of uncertainty and normativity (see Figure 2). It 
should be more problem- than solution-oriented in debates, and influence different agendas in 
different parts of the world. The international boundary organisations should move from being 
geared to a centralized, rational rule approach to a much more disjointed, geographically 
differentiated innovative policy processes. This means “innovation” in the double sense of 
“governance of innovation” (e.g. of energy decarbonisation) but also “innovation of governance” 
(away from outdated, inflexible UN multilateral agreement strategies)106. It can be argued that this 
differentiation is already occurring101,107, in which case the pertinent questions are how to sensibly 
link the different  elements of the multi-actor and multi-level climate governance regime, and if any, 
what the role of the UNFCCC could be in this regard.101  
Opening up policy debate requires fostering of multiple scientific theories on climate change. 
Politicians should no longer cast global science in the role of certification machine, but develop their 
own local or national policy framings, responding to climate change in their own terms and ensuring 
boundary arrangements are fit for this purpose. It seems also obvious that global climate 
governance must draw on a much broader range of knowledge and stakeholders.108 For IPCC the 
radical implication may be its transformation, except for the scientific assessment tasks of Working 
Group I.  Instead, it should be reformed as a global “UN Centre for Climate Change” for study of 
potential approaches and instruments for climate policy-making, engaging in reasoned debate on 
problem structuring and alternative ways of problem decomposition, and establishing and 
developing ‘situated’ branches that support national, regional, local and manifold transnational 
policy initiatives through a portfolio of approaches and strategies of democratic governance  where 
there is space for ignorance and surprise.109 
Apart from practical reforms, there is good reason for more empirical research using the boundary 
work lens for lesson learning. The intensive boundary work at SBSTA, SBI and (in 1990-1995) INC, has 
hardly been studied. Yet it is imperative for climate policy to gain more knowledge of policy-analytic 
boundary work for instrument design in multi-stakeholder and high-stakes settings.108,110 Equally, 
little is known about how boundary work actually happens, even in countries like Germany or the 
UK, let alone in developing countries.  Given the international and transnational character of 
collective action on the climate change issue, a return to subnational and national incremental 
governance approaches is not desirable. We need a truly multi-level approach to the study of 
governance regimes.  It is imperative to closely study and learn from global-local boundary work 
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dynamics40 and study if and how lower-level incremental approaches trigger  policymaking responses 
in other countries or levels of governance.111  
Lesson drawing and best practice research, however, have their limits also when it comes to 
boundary work. This is partly because they do not travel easily from one context of application to 
another: boundary work experience with ozone depletion, nuclear radiation and acid rain turned out 
to be not very usable for climate change. More importantly, our inability to know enough forces us 
at some point to stop the cognitive process and shift to action. Hence, any learning in a political task 
field should not be limited to scientific research and lessons based on analysis; it necessarily takes 
the shape of pragmatic trial-and-error learning by variation-and-selection. We hope that this analysis 
of boundary organisation and boundary work for climate change knowledge and politics becomes 
part of a larger learning process for renewed efforts to create and maintain a productive and 
creative tension between science-as-puzzling and politics-as-powering in the struggle over policy.  
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